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IN THE SUPREME COURrii 
OF THE STATE OF lJri"All 
KEITH NORTH, By and through his 
Guardian Ad Litem, C. E. NORTH. 
Plaintiff and Appellamt. 
YS. 
C. H. CARTWRIGHT, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7457 
Brief of Appellant 
NATURE OF CASE 
This suit was brought by the appellant, Keith North, 
by and through his guardian ad litem, C. E. North, 
against the respondent, C. H. Cartwright, to recover 
damages for personal injuries sustained by the appellant 
as a result of the respondent's driving an automobile 
against the appellant and the motor scooter he was oper-
ating, the collision occurring on First South Street below 
the intersection of Regent Street. At the close of the 
trial the court directed a verdict of no cause of action, 
and this appeal was taken. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the outset we desire to call the court's attention 
to the fact that this case does not involve an intersection 
accident, although it was so regarded by the trial court. 
The undisputed evidence discloses that the collision oe-
curred at a point on First South Street 21 feet west of 
the west curb line of Regent Street. (R. 108). 
Appellant, a boy 17, was operating a small motor 
scooter (Exhibit A) in a westerly direction on First 
South Street (R. 48) at a speed of about 10 miles per 
hour (R. 46). Seated behind him on the scooter was 
Robert Cox, 14, ( R. 33-34). As they passed through the 
intersection of Regent Street and First South Robert 
Cox saw the respondent approaching from the left and 
noted that the respondent was not looking in the scooter's 
direction. Cox jumped off the scooter shouting, ''Look 
out, Keith!'' The impact followed imediately after the 
Cox boy jumped (R. 35). Prior to the impact, the appel-
lant got a fleeting glimpse of the respondent's automobile 
through his rear view mirror (R. 59.) The act of the Cox 
boy in jumping off affected the motor scooter. The Cox 
boy knew that it "pushed a little" when he jumped (R. 
40). The motor scooter was going straight forward in a 
westerly direction when the Cox boy jumped off, (R. 45) 
and the scooter was close to and on the north side of the 
center lines (R. 92). The appellant explained his pres-
ence on the south side of the white lines at the point of 
impact in the following manner: 
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''A. \Yell, I don't actually know, but I think this 
could haYe happened: ·when Bob jumped 
off, which he did, because I remember he 
jumped off, and it's a small motor; it 
doesn't weig-h yery much ,and it can be 
pushed real-a slig-ht shove can send it 
anywheres and at that time it was just that 
quick." (R. 93) 
The position of the Cox boy behind appellant on the 
scooter did not interfere at all with the operation of the 
scooter (R. 34, 49, 50). 
The respondent told Officer Price that he stopped 
for the stop sign on Regent Street and First South, that 
traffic was heavy and he did not notice the boy on the 
motor scooter until the time of impact.. He did not know 
where the appellant came from or how he managed to 
get in front of him (R. 137). The respondent asserted 
that he looked twice to the west and once to the east as 
he started up from the stop sign making his left turn, but 
he did not see anything of the motor scooter at that time. 
He heard the impact and his car automatically disengag-
ed and stopped instantly. He saw the Cox boy jump off 
shouting and that was the first time he was aware of the 
situation (R. 154, 155). At the time he started up from 
the stop sign his eyes were pretty much focused on a Salt 
Lake City Lines bus going west on First South, and he 
considered that it was safe for him to turn as far as the 
bus was concerned. He did not see any other vehicles at 
all on the highway east of the intersection (R. 160). The 
first inkling- he got that a boy was operating a scooter in 
the vicinity was after he heard the impact. He sort of 
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saw the boy jump back out of the. right hand side of his 
eye. Hardly a second passed from the time the boy 
jumped back and the time he heard the impact. He was 
not quite headed west when the impact occurred and the 
front of the car was about four feet from the center line 
at the time of impact (R. 163). Despite the skid marks 
shown on Exhibit ''A'' the respondent said he did not 
apply his brakes, but that the car just stopped on its 
own accord when it hit the boy. (R. 165) After the colli-
sion he backed his car up about four feet, (R. 155) drag-
ging the appellant, whose leg was caught (R. 57, 81). 
The right front bumper of respondent's car con-
tacted the motor scooter (R. 41) on the left rear side 
(R. 35, 56). There were gouge marks indicating where 
the scooter had been dragged by the backing operation, 
which marks were located 21 feet west of the west side 
of Regent Street and approximately 8 feet south of the 
double line (R. 108). There were also skid marks made 
by the Chrysler near that point extending for four feet 
(R. 133, Exhibit "A"). Newly painted white lines, four 
in number, ran down the center of First South and 
First South is 90 feet from curb to curb. (R. 104-105) 
There were marks of paint on the right front bumper of 
the Chrysler (R. 116). At the time Exhibit "A" was 
taken the car had been moved from the point of im-
pact, except for the four-foot backing operation when the 
appellant was dragged (R. 168). The extent and nature 
of appellant's injuries are not material here. 
It was stipulated at the trial that the following 
ordinance of Salt Lake City was in full force and effect, 
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I 
Section 6128 ( c)3, Re-dsed Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, 1944: 
''The driver of a Yehicle shall likewise stop in 
obedience to a stop sign as required herein at an 
intersection where n stop sign is erected at one or 
more entrances thereto although not a part of a 
through highway and shall proceed cautiously, 
yielding to vehicles not so obliged to stop which 
are within the intersection or approaching so close-
ly as to constitute an immediate hazard, but may 
then proceed.'' 
To summarize the facts, it is clear that appellant 
was traYeling close to and on the north side of the center 
lines at a speed of about 10 miles per hour in a straight 
westerly course. He had crossed through the intersection 
when the respondent, operating his vehicle without ob-
serving appellant, cut the corner making a left turn. 
The turning automobile came into fleeting view of appel-
lant's rear view mirror the instant before the impact 
which occurred 21 feet west of the west curb line of the 
intersection. The respondent admits that he at no time 
saw appellant until after the impact. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH 
APPELLANT RELIES. 
Point I. The respondent's negligence was clear and 
undisputed. 
Point II. The appellant was not contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I. The respondent's negligence was clear a;nd 
undisputed. 
The .failure of the respondent to observe the appel-
lant on his motor scooter prior to the impact was negli-
gence. The failure of the respondent to yield the right-of-
way to the appellant was negligence. The conduct of the 
respondent in cutting the corner and hitting the appellant 
at a point 21 feet west of the west curb line of Regent 
Street was negligence-respondent should have been on 
the north side of the center line prior to that point in 
the reasonable operation of his car. It is likewise clear 
that the negligent acts and omissions of the respondent 
were the proximate cause of the collision. 
Point II. The appellant was not con~ributorily negligent 
as a matter of law. 
We do not think that the evidence discloses that ap-
pellant was contributorily negligent at all, much less con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law. If, as he ap-
proached the intersection of First South and Regent 
Street at a speed of approximately 10 miles per hour, 
he had looked to the left and had observed that the respon-
dent was stopped at the stop sign, the appellant would 
have been reasonably justified in assuming that the 
respondint would not enter the intersection, having 
stopped, until it became safe for him to do so. If, as 
the appellant entered the intersection from the east, he 
had looked and observed that the respondent was pro-
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ceeding into the intersection on a turn to the west, the 
appellant would still be reasonably justified in assuming 
that the respondent would continue to yield the right-of-
way, particularly in view of the evidence that the re-
spondent was proceeding slowly. After appellant had 
completely negotiated the intersection, it would be un-
reasonable to require him to continue to be apprehensive 
of traffic approaching from his left rear, particularly in 
view of the fact that he was proceeding very close to the 
center line, and after having passed the intersection 
it was not reasonably foreseeable that traffic would en-
danger him from the left rear. Certainly by the time ap-
pellant arrived at the point of the impact which was 21 
feet west of the -west curbline of the intersection, he would 
have been reasonably justified in divorcing his attention 
from any traffic that could have proceeded out of Regent 
Street, including the automobile driven by the respondent. 
The traffic was heavy and ordinary prudence would re-
quire that the appellant give considerable attention to the 
road ahead and to his right. It does not, therefore, appear 
under what conceivable interpretation of the evidence 
the trial court was justified in holding as a matter of law 
that the appellant was contributorily negligent in permit-
ting himself to be struck from the left rear by the re-
spondent under the circumstances of this case. The case 
at bar is much stronger from the appellant's standpoint 
than that of Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 P. 2d 510. 
In that case the appellant was driving at 15 miles per 
hour southward on Grant A venue, which was a through 
highway. The respondents were driving an ambulance 
eastward on 31st Street at a speed variously described 
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as from 25 to 50 miles per hour, as it approached the inter-
section with Grant Avenue. The point of collision was 
three feet west of the center point of the intersection. We 
quote the following from the decision commencing on 
page 64 of the Utah Reports : 
'' ... The trial court instructed the jury that 
the plaintiff was negligent in not so looking. But 
does it follow as beyond dispute that had plain-
tiff looked and seen the ambulance approaching, 
reasonable and prudent conduct would have dic-
tated that he stop until the ambulance had crossed 
the intersection~ Are the facts revealed by the 
evidence so clear and certain that the court could 
say that for plaintiff to drive into the intersection 
without stopping was not the act of an ordinarily 
prudent and careful man~ Since such question 
must be answered from the circumstances existing 
at the time, we are immediately confronted with 
the question as to the speed of the ambulance. If 
the ambulance was coming at 50 miles per hour, 
as one witness testified, it might suggest to a 
reasonable man that the ambulance probably would 
not stop, or at least raise a reasonable apprehen-
sion of danger. If on the other hand, as defend-
ants testified, the ambulance was coming only 25 
miles per hour, (the course being upgrade) an 
ordinarily prudent man may conclude that the 
driver had his car under control and would stop 
as required by law at the stop sign. As to what 
the circumstances were at the time plaintiff enter-
ed the intersection and as to whether entering 
under such circumstances was an act from which 
a person of ordinary prudence and caution would 
have foreseen that some injury would likely result, 
are matters upon which minds may differ. As 
such they are properly for the jury. Proximate 
cause and contributory negligence are ordinarily 
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I 
I 
questions of fart for the jury to determine under 
all the circumstances. Great N. R. Co. v. Thomp-
son, 9 Cir., 199 F. 395, 118 C.C.A. 79, 47 L.R.A., 
~.S. 506; Hales Y. Michigan Cent. R. Co. 6 Cir., 200 
F. 533, 118 C.C.A. G:37. Questions of negligence do 
not become questions of law for the court except 
where the facts are such that all reasonable men 
draw the same conclusions ... " 
In the case just cited the collision occurred near the 
center of the intersection and the ambulance was ap-
proaching the intersection at a speed of from 25 to 50 
miles per hour and yet the court held that it was a jury 
question as to whether or not the plaintiff, had he looked, 
could have assumed that the ambulance would have 
honored the stop sign. In the case at bar the collision oc-
curred 21 feet west of the westernmost line of the inter-
section, and the respondent had stopped at the stop sign 
and was proceeding slowly into the intersection on a left 
turn. The conclusion is irresistible that the trial court 
did violence to the principles established by the Hess 
case supra. This case is distinguishable on its facts from 
the more recent case of Hickok v. Skinner, 190 P. 2d 514 
(Utah 1948). In that case the evidence showed that th~ 
defendant's vehicle was approaching the intersection at a 
distance of 400 or 500 feet at a rate of 45 miles per hour 
when first observed by the plaintiff, who had stopped 20 
feet back from the intersection. The appellant didn't pay 
any further attention to the respondent's fast approach-
ing vehicle during any of that time that he traversed a 
distance of 65 feet and for a period of approximately six 
or seven seconds. The accident occurred within the inter-
section. The court held that the appellant was guilty of 
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contributory negligence as a matter of law in not look-
ing again to evaluate the speed of the respondent's 
car and reappraise the relative position of the two cars. 
In the case at bar this speed was not involved and are-
appraisal of the relative position of the vehicle prior to 
the impact would not have required the appellant, in the 
exercise of ordinary prudence, to assume that the re-
spondent would not continue to honor his superjor right 
within and beyond the intersection. The respondent, hav-
ing stopped, proceeded slowly (though blindly) on his left 
turn, and was apparently yielding the right-of-way to 
the appellant or at least to traffic proceeding in the ap-
pellant's direction. 
The case of Hess v. Robinson, supra, was referred to 
1n the opinion of this court in the case of Conklitn v. 
Walsh, (Utah 1948) 193 P. 2d 437, in which later case the 
court, referring to the Hess case, made the following 
statement on page 439: 
"The driver of the car travelling the through 
street, even though he should have seen the am-
bulance, which according to the evidence, was 
traveling between 25 and 50 miles per hour, could 
not know it would not stop for the stop sign until 
the vehicles were so close together that he would 
have no chance to avoid the collision." 
In the Conklin v. Walsh case, the operator of the 
truck approaching the intersection from the west on 
South Temple had observed the approach of the plain-
tiff's car on the left but paid no further regard to it 
during the time that he travelled a quarter of a block 
(165 feet), and at the time he first saw the other vehicle, 
10 
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that vehicle was much nearer the intersection than was 
his. Again the truck was travelling between 30 and 45 
miles per hour and the collision occurred within the inter-
section. None of the circumstances upon which this court 
predicated its decision in that case is presented by the 
evidence in the case at bar. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court, in directing the verdict against the 
appellant, has ruled that as a matter of law there was no 
reasonable view of the evidence which would have per-
mitted the appellant to recover. Nevertheless, in the 
review and discussion of the evidence in this brief we 
have not just seized upon that portion of the evidence 
most favorable to the position of the appellant, but we 
have considered the evidence as a whole; and we respect-
fully conclude that, under any reasonable view of the 
evidence that can be taken in this case, the appellant was 
entitled to have the question of his contributory negli-
gence determ~ned by the jury, and the trial court was al-
together unjustified in holding as a matter of law that 
the appellant was guilty of contributory negligence. 
EDWARD W. CLYDE, 
ALLAN E. MECHAM, 
WOODROW D. WHITE, 
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